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The Deductibility of Daily
Transportation Expenses To and
From Distant Temporary Work
Sites
Michael D. Rose*
In the Article Professor Rose addresses the uncertainty that has
characterized judicial application of Internal Revenue Code provi-
sions to daily transportation expenses to and from distant temporary
work sites. Although the Internal Revenue Code disallows deductions
for commuting expenses to and from work, transportation expenses
between work sites are deductible. The courts have had some difficulty
applying these principles to distant temporary work sites. Professor
Rose argues that the United States Tax Court in Turner v. Commis-
sioner has fomented much of this confusion. Although the court
reached the correct determination on the facts, its rationale is flawed.
According to Professor Rose, the temporary/indefinite test that the
courts of appeals use is the appropriate standard for deciding whether
these expenses are deductible.
I. INTRODUCTION
The expenses of commuting to and from work are not deducti-
ble for federal income tax purposes.1 The rationale for this princi-
ple is that taxpayers who live at a distance from their places of
work do so for personal reasons.' Taxpayers, however, may deduct
* Professor of Law, Ohio State University. B.A., 1959, Ohio Wesleyan University;
LL.B., 1963, Case Western Reserve University; LL.M., 1967, Columbia University. The au-
thor gratefully acknowledges the contributions of Edward C. Samsel, his research assistant.
1. See, e.g., McCabe v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 102, 105 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 208 (1982); Kasun v. United States, 671 F.2d 1059, 1061 (7th Cir. 1982).
"[N]o deduction shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses." I.R.C. § 262
(1976). The "costs of commuting [to the] place of business or employment are personal
expenses." Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(5), T.D. 7207, 1972-2 C.B. 106, 157. The Code allows "as
a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year in carrying on any trade or business . . . ." I.R.C. § 162(a) (1976). However,
"[c]ommuter expenses are not considered as business expenses and are not deductible."
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(e) (1958).




transportation expenses that they incur going between work sites'
because this type of travel is "motivated by purely business rea-
sons."4 Although these principles are well established, their appli-
cation to daily transportation expenses to and from distant tempo-
rary work sites is problematic. Much of the uncertainty
surrounding the issue arises from Turner v. Commissioner, a case
the entire United States Tax Court reviewed.5
In Turner the Tax Court concluded that taxpayer, a consult-
ant engineer who worked as a temporary employee, could not de-
duct his transportation expenses for daily trips between his resi-
dence and workplaces because the journeys constituted
commuting.6 On appeal the Commissioner moved to vacate and re-
mand 7 the case with directions to enter a new decision of no defi-
ciency.8 The motion followed the Commissioner's reexamination of
his position in Turner and his determination not to pursue this
position further.9 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
granted the motion. 10 The sweeping language of Judge Dawson's
opinion for the Tax Court arguably prompted the Commissioner's
motion. The opinion rejected the notion that the temporary nature
of work may make transportation expenses deductible under sec-
tion 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.11
Before the Second Circuit's order to vacate and remand the
case for entry of a decision of no deficiency, the Tax Court had
followed Turner twice.12 Then in 1976 when the Tax Court "again
faced. . the troublesome question of how to deal with travel ex-
penses . . . which partake of the character of commuting ex-
penses,"1 the court acceded to the parties' framing of the issue "in
classical terms""'-that is, whether taxpayer's employment was
3. See, e.g., Steinhort v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 496, 504 (5th Cir. 1964).
4. Curphey v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 766, 778 (1980), appeal dismissed, No. 80-7678
(9th Cir. Feb. 22, 1982).
5. 56 T.C. 27 (1971).
6. Id. at 33.
7. Appellee's Motion to Vacate Decision of Tax Court, Turner v. Commissioner, No.
71-1926 (2d Cir. Feb. 28, 1972).
8. Id. at 2.
9. Id.
10. Order Granting Appellee's Motion to Vacate and Remand, Turner v. Commis-
sioner, No. 71-1926 (2d Cir. Mar. 21, 1972).
11. Turner v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. at 32. Only the trial judge dissented. Id. at 33.
12. Gurney v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1429 (1971); Crowson v. Commissioner,
30 T.C.M. (CCH) 953 (1971).




temporary or indefinite in duration. If the job was temporary, the
taxpayer could deduct the expenses incurred going to and from
work because they arose "from the exigencies of business and not
from the taxpayer's personal choice to live at a distance from his
work."'15 If, on the other hand, the job was of indefinite duration,
the transportation expenses would not be deductible. The Tax
Court subsequently has decided a number of cases using this
analysis."'
Five months after the Tax Court first decided the issue of de-
ductibility of transportation expenses in classical terms, the Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS) published Revenue Ruling 76-45317 and
announced that it would follow Turner. Consequently, transporta-
tion expenses between a taxpayer's residence and temporary place
of work would not be deductible.' 8 The IRS postponed the effec-
tive date' 9 of Revenue Ruling 76-453 several times2" and finally
suspended it indefinitely.2 1
In 1977 Congress directed the IRS and the courts to determine
the treatment of transportation costs between a taxpayer's resi-
dence and workplace "without regard to Revenue Ruling 76-453
[or] (... to any . . . decision reaching the same result as, or a
result similar to, the result set forth in such Revenue Ruling) [but]
with full regard to the rules in effect before Revenue Ruling 76-
453. 22 When first enacted, this mandate was to apply to transpor-
tation costs that taxpayers paid or incurred between January 1,
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Portillo v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 1085 (1982); Hazelton v.
Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1287 (1982); Fairey v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH)
1169 (1982); Faircloth v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1115 (1982); Conte v. Commis-
sioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1296 (1981); Deblock v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 774
(1980); McCallister v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 505, 508 (1978).
In one recent case the Commissioner did not ask the Tax Court to apply the temporary/
indefinite test to decide the issue. Paolini v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 513 (1982),
aff'd, No. 82-3290 (3d Cir. Jan. 17, 1983). Instead, the Commissioner contended that the
taxpayer's daily trips to and from temporary job sites were nondeductible commuting ex-
penses; the Tax Court agreed. See infra note 157.
17. 1976-47 I.R.B. 6.
18. Rev. Rul. 76-453, 1976-2 C.B. 86.
19. The effective date originally was Jan. 1, 1977. [1983] 3 FED. TAXES (P-H) 11, 426.
20. See, e.g., Announcement 77-113, 1977-28 I.R.B. 18 (effective date postponed to
Oct. 1, 1977); Announcement 77-23, 1977-7 I.R.B. 31 (effective date postponed to July 1,
1977). See infra text accompanying notes 95-99.
21. IRS News Rel. IR-1884 (Sept. 23, 1977), [1977] 6 FED. TAXES (P-H) 1 55,898.
22. Act of Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-427, § 2, 92 Stat. 996. See generally Parnell,
Congressional Interference in Agency Enforcement: The IRS Experience, 89 YALE L.J.
1360 (1980) (analysis of problems caused by legislative prohibitions on the IRS).
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1977, and January 1, 1980.23 Congress then extended the period to
June 1, 1981.24 Ostensibly, the purpose of the moratorium was to
allow Congress time to study the deductibility of expenses for
transportation between a taxpayer's residence and workplace.2 5
More likely, however, Congress sought to assuage outcries28 over
the position that the IRS had expressed in Revenue Ruling 76-453.
Indeed, both the Senate and House Reports state that "transporta-
tion expenses to temporary worksites other than the taxpayer's
principal place of work often are deductible ....
The courts of appeals have applied the temporary/indefinite
test to daily transportation expenses even though the Tax Court
rejected it in Turner.28 For example, the Seventh Circuit recently
announced an exception to the general rule of nondeductibility of
commuting expenses. Under the Seventh Circuit's approach tax-
payers may deduct daily transportation expenses to and from dis-
tant temporary job sites under section 162(a).29
This Article examines Turner and the efforts of the IRS to
resolve the issue of the deductibility of daily transportation ex-
penses to and from distant temporary work sites. The Article com-
pares the Tax Court's view in Turner with the approach that the
courts of appeals have taken and concludes that although the Tax
Court reached the correct result in Turner, it espoused a flawed
rationale. The Article maintains that the IRS has not interpreted
Turner satisfactorily. The basic approach of the courts of appeals
is sound; hence the Tax Court and the IRS should adopt it. The
23. Act of Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-427, § 2, 92 Stat. 996 (1978).
24. Act of Dec. 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-167, § 2, 93 Stat. 1275 (1979). The Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981 did not extend the May 31, 1981, expiration date. See H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 215, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 268, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 285,
357. But see Rev. Proc. 82-22, § 6, 1982-13 I.R.B. 16, 20-21 (Public Law 96-167 prohibits
IRS from ruling on commuting expenses).
25. S. REP. No. 433, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEWs 2594, 2599; H.R. REP. No. 1232, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2508, 2511.
26. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1977, at 67, col. 1; Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1977, at 17,
col. 1; Wall St. J., June 16, 1977, at 40, col. 2; Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 1976, at 2, col. 1.
27. S. REP. No. 433, supra note 25, at 5, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEWs at 2598; H.R. REP. No. 1232, supra note 25, at 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 2511; see also H.R. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 284 (Section 806 of
H.R. 4242, Tax Incentive Bill of 1981, would have extended the mandate to cover transpor-
tation costs paid or incurred after May 31, 1981, and before June 1, 1983.).
28. Neal v. Commissioner, 681 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1982); Kasun v. United States, 671
F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1982); Frederick v. United States, 603 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1979); Boone
v. United States, 482 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973).
29. Kasun v. United States, 671 F.2d at 1061.
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Article also suggests refinements to the appellate courts' approach.
II. Turner v. Commissioner
A. Facts and Holding
William B. Turner resided in Brooklyn, New York, and
worked at a plant of one company in Syosset,30 New York, for six-
teen months and then at a plant of another company in Norwalk, 1
Connecticut, for eight months.3 2 He obtained employment through
two New York City job shops that supplied companies with techni-
cal employees to work on specific projects or government contracts.
Although Turner received his pay checks from the job shops, he
had no contact with them other than to visit their offices at the
beginning of his employment in Syosset and Norwalk and to re-
ceive a few telephone calls from them.3
The Tax Court held that Turner was "simply a commuter
[who] traveled from his residence to his principal (indeed only)
place of duty and returned each night.""4 Observing that the job
shops merely functioned as employment agencies, the court re-
jected Turner's argument that the job shops in New York City
were his employers and principal places of business. 5 The court
stated that Turner "was an employee of the job shops in form only;
in substance he worked for the client contractors."36 Given the
facts, the Tax Court's conclusion that Turner could not deduct his
transportation expenses is unassailable. The cost of going between
one's residence and place of employment clearly is a nondeductible
personal expense.37 The court, however, did not use this direct
analysis to reach its result. Furthermore, Judge Dawson used
broad language that extended far beyond the facts of the case.
The court began with a disjointed discussion of petitioner's
two theories of deductibility, both of which the court rejected.
First, the court addressed taxpayer's "primary argument"38 that
because he was an employee of the job shops assigned temporarily
30. The Syosset plant was 36 miles from taxpayer's Brooklyn residence. Turner v.
Commissioner, 56 T.C. at 29.
31. The Norwalk plant was 60 miles from taxpayer's residence. Id.
32. Id. at 28.
33. Id. at 28-29.
34. Id. at 32-33.
35. Id. at 32.
36. Id.
37. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
38. Turner v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. at 30.
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to work outside the New York City area his transportation costs
were deductible under Revenue Ruling 60-147.11 The court de-
clined to find that the job shops were Turner's principal places of
business and thus rejected this argument.
Second, the court addressed the taxpayer's alternative argu-
ment that because he was a temporary employee, his Brooklyn res-
idence was his tax home, and the transportation costs of going to
and from work were deductible expenses that he had incurred
"while away from home" within the meaning of section 162(a)(2).40
The court rejected this argument, relying on United States v. Cor-
rell.41 In that case the United States Supreme Court endorsed the
overnight rule, which interprets the phrase "away from home" to
require sleep or rest before travel expenses are deductible under
section 162(a)(2).42 Because Turner did not sleep or rest on his way
to and from work, he did not incur travel expenses "away from
39. 1960-1 C.B. 682. Petitioner's Brief and Reply Brief fail to cite the revenue ruling.
Indeed, the pro se taxpayer's Brief contains no citations and his Reply Brief only refers to
four cases that respondent had cited. Respondent's Brief and Reply Brief do not mention
this revenue ruling.
The IRS announced in Revenue Ruling 60-147 that it would "no longer litigate cases
arising under section 22(n)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 where an employee
incurs transportation expenses. ..on business trips. . . outside his home area but. . . not
...overnight." Id. Section 22(n)(2) defined adjusted gross income as gross income minus
the expenses of travel while away from home. The 1939 Code had no provision comparable
to I.R.C. § 62(2)(C), which allows an employee to subtract business transportation expenses
from gross income to arrive at adjusted gross income, although the expenses are not reim-
bursable or incurred while away from home. The IRS pointed out in the revenue ruling that
the issue does not arise under the 1954 Code. Hence, the position it had announced applied
"only to the deductibility of an employee's nonreimbursable business transportation ex-
penses under section 22(n)(2) of the 1939 Code." Id. at 683. The Tax Court's statement in
Turner that petitioner sought to deduct his transportation costs under Revenue Ruling 60-
147 therefore seems erroneous. The court did discuss and quote the revenue ruling several
paragraphs later in the opinion. Perhaps the Tax Court was referring to Rev. Rul. 190, 1953-
2 C.B. 303, which the dissent cited and discussed, 56 T.C. at 34 n.1, when the court first
mentioned Revenue Ruling 60-147. Under Revenue Ruling 190, if a taxpayer works tempo-
rarily "at a distance from the metropolitan area in which he is regularly employed," the
daily transportation expenses to and from the temporary site are deductible. Rev. Rul. 190,
1953-2 C.B. at 305. The Tax Court may have concluded that Turner failed to establish that
the New York City area was his regular place of employment. Alternatively, the court may
have rejected the position that the IRS took in Revenue Ruling 190 concerning the deduct-
ibility of transportation expenses.
40. Turner v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. at 30. Section 162(a)(2) allows a deduction for
"traveling expenses (including amounts expended for meals and lodging ... ) while away
from home in the pursuit of a trade or business." For a discussion of the history of §
162(a)(2), see Comment, The Tax Home Doctrine: Fifty-Five Years of Confusion, 34 ME. L.
REv. 141, 142-46 (1982).
41. 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
42. Id. at 302, 307.
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home" and, therefore, could not deduct them under this provision
of the Code.
B. An Analysis of the Turner Rationale
The Turner court avoided direct resolution of the issue before
it and instead announced that "the concepts of 'temporary' or 'in-
definite' employment, which bear upon the issue under section
162(a)(2) of whether it is reasonable for a taxpayer to move his
residence near his employment, are of little or no value in distin-
guishing transportation expenses from commuting expenses. '43
The Tax Court's use of Turner, a case it had reviewed,44 to an-
nounce its rejection of the temporary/indefinite test is difficult to
comprehend, especially since the parties had not argued the issue
of the test's application in their briefs, and the court had disposed
of taxpayer's arguments on other grounds.
As authority for its statement that the temporary versus in-
definite character of the employment has little or no value in de-
termining the deductibility of transportation expenses, the Tax
Court cited4" footnote twenty-four of Steinhort v. Commissioner,
which reads in part: "The 'temporary,' 'indeterminate' distinction,
although of great use in determining the deductibility of expenses
under § 162(a)(2) where work is done in another. . . locality, does
not cut into the principle of denying a deduction for 'commuting
expenses'. . . ." The sentence continues, however, with the qualifi-
cation "for travel within the same metropolitan area as the tax-
payer's established home. '4'  The Tax Court disregarded these
43. Turner v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. at 31. The outcome of the temporary/indefinite
test has a direct impact on the issue raised by § 162(a)(2)-whether a taxpayer reasonably
could be expected to move his residence closer to his place of work and thus avoid incurring
duplicate living expenses. See infra text accompanying notes 71 & 74-75.
44. The Chief Judge of the Tax Court determines whether review of the trial judge's
report is necessary. If the Chief Judge decides that the court will review, he places the case
on the conference calendar. At the conference the judges discuss and vote on the trial
judge's report. If the majority rejects the report and the trial judge who wrote the original
report does not agree with the majority, the Chief Judge assigns the report to another judge
for rewriting. H. DUBROFF, THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT. AN HISTORIcAL ANALYsIs 355-56
(1979). In Turner Judge Dawson rewrote the report. Judge Quealy, the trial judge, see Brief
for Respondent at 1, Turner v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 27 (1971), who had written the origi-
nal report, dissented, 56 T.C. at 33.
45. Turner v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. at 31.
46. 335 F.2d 496, 504 n.24 (5th Cir. 1964). Two years after the Tax Court decided
Turner, the Fifth Circuit said that transportation costs for travel outside the area of the
principal place of work are deductible if the employment is temporary rather than indefi-
nite. Boone v. United States, 482 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973). In Boond the court concluded
that the employment was indefinite. Consequently, taxpayer's expenses incurred in going to
1983] 547
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qualifying words. The entire sentence arguably manifests the Fifth
Circuit's belief that transportation expenses for daily travel
outside the metropolitan area in which the taxpayer usually works
are deductible under section 162(a). The text of the opinion ac-
companying footnote twenty-four states that "where a construction
worker obtains employment at a 'temporary' place of work-
temporary in the sense that a worker would not reasonably move
his family to that area-travel costs are deductible. 4  Neverthe-
less, in Turner the Tax Court refused to apply the temporary/in-
definite test to transportation expenses under section 162(a).48
The Tax Court's notion in Turner that transportation ex-
penses for one-day trips without sleep or rest are not deductible
under section 162(a)(2) is unwarranted. The Supreme Court in
Correll did not specifically address the issue because the case con-
cerned only deductions for meal expenses. The question before the
Supreme Court concerned the validity of the Commissioner's long-
standing rule "that a taxpayer traveling on business may deduct
the cost of his meals only if his trip requires him to stop for sleep
or rest. '4 9 Correll, therefore, left undecided the question whether
the overnight rule applies to transportation expenses. Moreover,
the rationale in the opinion, which addresses meal expenses, is not
applicable to transportation expenses. The Court examined the
language of section 162(a) and indicated that paragraph (2) sup-
ports the rule because the section refers to meals in conjunction
with lodging. The Court noted that the statute specifies "meals
and lodging," which suggests that Congress contemplated a deduc-
tion for meals only when the travel also requires lodging.50 "Lodg-
ing," of course, denotes stopping to sleep or rest. The treatment of
meals and lodging as a unit does not necessarily require the inclu-
sion of transportation in that unit.5 1 Nevertheless, several courts of
appeals agree with the position that the Tax Court took in Turner:
and from the job site did not qualify for deduction under I.R.C. § 162(a).
47. 335 F.2d 496, 504 (5th Cir. 1964).
48. See infra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
49. United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. at 299.
50. • Id. at 304.
51. For commentary that daily transportation expenses are not deductible under §
162(a)(2), see Note, Extraordinary Commuting Expenses: Deductibility of Transportation
Expenses Between Residence and Temporary Place of Business, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 499,
501-05 (1978); Comment, Federal Income Taxation-A Survey of Commuting Deductions
Under § 162 of the Internal Revenue Code and the Ramifications of United States v. Cor-
rell, 60 Ky. L.J. 427, 436-39 (1972); Comment, Travel, Transportation, and Commuting Ex-
penses: Problems Involving Deductibility, 43 Mo. L. REv. 525, 530-31 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, Travel, Transportation, and Commuting Expenses].
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that the overnight rule applies to all travel expenses which taxpay-
ers claim as deductions under section 162(a)(2), not just expenses
for meals and lodging.
52
III. POST-Turner TAX COURT OPINIONS
Although the Tax Court in 1976 applied the temporary/indefi-
nite test for daily transportation expenses,53 the Turner rationale
did not disappear from the court's opinions. Both before and after
the Second Circuit vacated and remanded Turner in 1972, the Tax
Court cited Turner and made no attempt to limit it to its facts.
For example, in Crowson v. Commissioner" the Tax Court denied
an oilfield worker a deduction for the cost of transportation to five
different job sites during one year. In an opinion by Judge Tiet-
jens, the court noted that the temporary/indefinite test has little or
no importance in distinguishing deductible transportation ex-
penses from commuting expenses.5 5 However, taxpayer had no
place of business from which to be away temporarily because ap-
parently he did not work regularly near his residence. 56 Conse-
quently, the reference to the temporary/indefinite distinction in
Crowson was unnecessary, as it was in Turner.
In Gurney v. Commissioner5 7 the Tax Court relied on Turner
to reject taxpayer's contention that the alleged temporary nature
of his job as a truck driver at a construction site about sixty miles
from his residence converted what otherwise would have been non-
deductible commuting expenses into ordinary and necessary busi-
ness expenses under section 162(a). The taxpayer in Gurney
worked continuously at the construction site for more than two
years. Judge Dawson, who wrote the Turner opinion, again ob-
served that the notion of temporary employment has little or no
value in distinguishing deductible transportation expenses from
nondeductible commuting expenses.5 8 The proper issue in Gurney
simply was whether a taxpayer may deduct the expenses of work-
day trips between his residence and his principal place of employ-
52. See, e.g., Frederick v. United States, 603 F.2d 1292, 1295 n.5 (8th Cir. 1979);
Boone v. United States, 482 F.2d 417, 419 n.2 (5th Cir. 1973); Sanders v. Commissioner, 439
F.2d 296, 298 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971); United States v. Tauferner, 407
F.2d 243, 245 (1oth Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 824 (1969).
53. See supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
54. 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 953 (1971).
55. Id. at 954.
56. Id. at 953-54.
57. 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1429 (1971).
58. Id. at 1430.
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ment. The court held that these expenses are not deductible be-
cause they enabled taxpayer only to go to and from work. 9 Judge
Dawson could have added that Turner presented the identical is-
sue and demanded the same conclusion on the ground that the
costs of transportation to and from the principal place of employ-
ment always are nondeductible.
In McCallister v. Commissioner the Tax Court further ex-
tended Turner by citing it for the proposition that "automobile
expenses in commuting between the taxpayer's residence and even
a temporary jobsite outside a taxpayer's normal area of employ-
ment are not deductible."60 The court reiterated this interpreta-
tion of Turner in Conte v. Commissioner.61 This view of Turner is
incorrect. Turner went from his residence in Brooklyn to his places
of work in Syosset and Norwalk and returned each night.62 The
facts do not indicate that Turner went to temporary job sites
outside the normal area of his employment. Indeed, the Tax Court
rejected Turner's argument that the New York City job shops were
his principal places of business.
The Tax Court's extension of Turner in these recent opinions
is unwarranted. Courts and the IRS could apply this expansive in-
terpretation of Turner to deny deductions for transportation ex-
penses that taxpayers incur on long one-day business trips. For ex-
ample, a taxpayer who travels by automobile from his residence,
located ten miles from a downtown office in which the taxpayer
maintains a principal place of employment, to a business meeting
150 miles away and who returns directly to his residence on the
same day could not deduct the transporation expenses.6
In contrast to the court's extension of Turner in McCallister
and Conte, in Pilcher v. Commissioner6 4 the court declined to dis-
cuss the issue of the deductibility of transportation expenses for a
59. Id.
60. 70 T.C. 505, 508 (1978) (emphasis added). In Portillo v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1085 (1982), Judge Drennen, citing Turner, commented that the court has held that
transportation expenses in commuting between one's residence and even a temporary job
site outside the normal area of employment are not deductible. This overbroad interpreta-
tion of Turner also appears in Rev. Rul. 76-453, 1976-2 C.B. 86. See infra text accompany-
ing note 94.
61. 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1296, 1298 (1981). Although the Tax Court cited Turner in
Conte and McCallister, it did rely upon the temporary/indefinite test to determine the de-
ductibility of transportation costs because the parties so framed the issue.
62. Turner v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. at 32-33.
63. Perhaps the statements in McCallister, Portillo, and Conte should be regarded
simply as dictum.
64. 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1089, 1091 (1979), aff'd, 651 F.2d 717 (10th Cir. 1981).
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taxpayer whose job requires him to go outside his primary work
area if he returns to his residence each day. This refusal in Pilcher
was a result of the court's unwillingness to decide an issue that the
Commissioner had conceded. Recently, the court has indicated
that regardless of the nature of the work, the distance the taxpayer
has traveled, or the mode of transportation, travel from the resi-
dence to the location where work begins and from the location
where work ceases to the residence represents commuting.6 5 Thus,
the Tax Court appears to have adopted the sweeping pronounce-
ments of the McCallister and Conte opinions and moved away
from the temporary/indefinite test for transportation costs.
IV. Turner AND THE COURT OF APPEALS: A COMPARISON OF
APPROACHES
Although in Turner the Tax Court rejected the concepts of
temporary and indefinite employment in distinguishing section
162(a) transportation expenses from nondeductible commuting ex-
penses,"6 the courts of appeals have applied the temporary/indefi-
nite test to decide whether daily expenses incurred in going to and
coming from distant work sites are deductible.07 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit recently justified its use of the test by
observing that the nondeductibility of commuting expenses is
"based on the assumption that a person will choose to live near the
work place." 8 Consequently, if an individual lives a distance from
his place of indefinite employment, transportation expenses to and
from work are nondeductible, personal expenses. Because a person
cannot be expected to move his residence near a temporary work
site,69 his transportation expenses to and from that site should be
deductible. In other words, "'"[t]he job, not the taxpayer's pat-
tern of living, must require the travel"' ,,7o before expenses are
65. Paolini v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 513, 518 (1982), al/'d, No. 82-3290 (3d
Cir. Jan. 17, 1983).
66. Turner v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 27, 31 (1971); see also Deblock v. Commissioner,
40 T.C.M. (CCH) 774 (1980) (temporary/indefinite test relevant to § 162(a)(2) cases, not to
general § 162(a) cases). Faircloth v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1115 (1982) (same
proposition as Deblock); see infra text accompanying notes 71-76.
67. Neal v. Commissioner, 681 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1982); Kasun v. United States, 671
F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1982); Frederick v. United States, 603 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1979); Boone
v. United States, 482 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973).
68. Kasun v. Commissioner, 671 F.2d at 1061.
69. Carragan v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 246, 249 (2d Cir. 1952). This language appears
in Kasun v. Commissioner, 671 F.2d at 1061, and in Commissioner v. Peurifoy, 254 F.2d 483,
486 (4th Cir. 1957), aff'd per curriam, 358 U.S. 59 (1958).
70. Kasun v. Commissioner, 671 F.2d at 1061 (quoting Commissioner v. Peurifoy, 254
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deductible.
The Tax Court in Turner acknowledged that the temporary/
indefinite test concerns the question whether a taxpayer reasona-
bly would move his residence closer to the place of employment. 1
The court rejected the use of this test to determine the deductibil-
ity of transportation expenses to and from temporary work sites,
however, because the court originally had devised the test for sec-
tion 162(a)(2), which addresses the deductibility of overnight
travel expenses. 2 Nevertheless, the court fails to explain why it
could not borrow the test and apply it to transportation expenses
under section 162(a).7 s Turner suggests that the test's only use is
to determine whether the taxpayer has duplicate living expenses.74
This narrow approach overlooks the premise on which the nonde-
ductibility of commuting expenses rests-namely, that the tax-
payer is free to choose the location of his residence relative to his
job. 7 5 If a person normally lives and works near the place of indefi-
F.2d 483, 486 (4th Cir. 1957), aff'd, 358 U.S. 59 (1958) (quoting Carragan v. Commissioner,
197 F.2d 246, 249 (2d Cir. 1952))). The court explained in Frederick v. United States, 603
F.2d at 1295:
A taxpayer has considerable discretion in determining where he wants to live when he
will be employed in a location for a substantial or indefinite period of time. This discre-
tion is severely limited or nonexistent when a taxpayer will be employed for only a
short or temporary period of time. Thus, the choice of a residence is a personal decision
in the first situation, and a business decision in the latter.
The court observed that the temporary/indefinite test serves a function in the context of §
162(a) similar to its role in § 162(a)(2) when an attempt is made to discern whether trans-
portation expenses are incurred for a business, rather than a personal, purpose. "The under-
lying premise in both situations is the idea that a taxpayer's choice of a residence is circum-
scribed by his expected term of employment." Id.; see also Haelton v. Commissioner, 43
T.C.M. (CCH) 1287 (1982) (court may consider some otherwise personal expenses as arising
from exigencies of business and not from personal choice to live at distance from work if
employment temporary).
71. Turner v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. at 31.
72. Under LR.C. § 162(a)(2) (1976) "traveling expenses (including amounts expended
for meals and lodging... ) while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business" are
deductible. See supra text accompanying note 42.
73. Section 162(a) states that "[tihere shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business, ...."
74. Turner v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. at 32.
75. See, e.g., Gilberg v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 611, 616-17 (1971). Writing for the Tax
Court, Judge Simpson explained in O'Hare v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 874, 875 (1970): "Al-
though commuting expenses are incurred in order to reach one's place of employment, they
are treated as nonbusiness expenses since their amount depends upon the place where one
chooses to reside-a choice which results from personal and family considerations." In Sulli-
van v. Commissioner, 1 B.T.A. 93 (1924), the Board of Tax Appeals adopted the reasoning
of the Commissioner set forth in S.M. 1048, 1 C.B. 101, 102-03 (1919):
Obviously an individual is free to fix his residence wherever he chooses. He fixes it
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nite employment but must work temporarily at a distant site, the
location of his residence in relation to that site is not a matter of
personal convenience and preference. In Turner the Tax Court ap-
propriately could have applied the temporary/indefinite test to de-
termine whether the taxpayer was free to choose the location of his
residence relative to his job and, ultimately, whether his transpor-
tation costs were deductible under section 162(a). Instead, the
court appeared unduly concerned that the temporary/indefinite
test originated with section 162(a)(2).
The duplicate expense rationale underlying the deductibility
of travel-away-from-home expenses, of course, is inapplicable to
daily transportation expenses to and from a temporary place of
work at a distance from the indefinite place of employment. This
distinction, however, should not preclude borrowing the tempo-
rary/indefinite concept to resolve the issue of deductibility of
transportation expenses under section 162(a). A separate rationale
exists for applying the concept under section 162(a)-the inability
of the taxpayer to determine the location of his residence in rela-
tion to his temporary work site. Indeed, courts of appeals have re-
ferred to the concept as "the best method that has evolved for
dealing with claims" arising under section 162(a) of taxpayers who
may make daily trips outside their principal work areas. 6
according to his personal convenience and inclinations, as a matter separate and apart
from business. Any expense, therefore, incident to such residence as fixed by the indi-
vidual is a matter personal to him. If he prefers, for personal reasons, to live in a differ-
ent city from that in which his business or employment is located, any expense incident
to so doing is the result of decision based upon personal convenience and preference,
and it is not the result of anything undertaken for business purposes and, therefore, is
not a business expense.
1 B.T.A. at 95. See also Anderson v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 834, 835 (1973) (personal prefer-
ences influence differences in distances traveled and amounts spent on commuting).
The Tax Court also has stated that commuting expenses are not deductible because
they are "so inherently personal in nature as to prohibit their characterization as business
expenses." Teil v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 841, 847 (1979); see also Pevsner v. Commissioner,
628 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1980) (although helpful or essential to business activities, com-
muting expenses disallowed under § 162 because they are inherently personal). From an
economist's perspective, "[a] great part of commuting expenses may be regarded as the con-
sequence of a consumption preference exercised in choosing a place of residence." R. GOODE,
THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAx 78 (rev. ed. 1976).
76. Kasun v. United States, 671 F.2d 1059, 1063 (7th Cir. 1982). The Ninth Circuit has
adopted the Kasun opinion. Neal v. Commissioner, 681 F.2d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir. 1982). Two
years after the Tax Court decided Turner, the Fifth Circuit held that daily transportation
expenses between residence and work are deductible if the taxpayer's employment is tempo-
rary. Boone v. United States, 482 F.2d 417, 419 (5th Cir. 1973). The Eighth Circuit applied
the temporary/indefinite test in Frederick v. United States, 603 F.2d 1292, 1294-95 (8th Cir.
1979), in aflirmance of the district court's judgment allowing a deduction for transportation
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V. THE CHANGING IRS VIEW
Following the Tax Court's opinion in Turner the IRS strug-
gled to formulate its own position. Vacillation and faulty analysis
have marred these efforts. Nevertheless, an examination of IRS ac-
tivity illustrates the difficulty of devising a framework that affords
reasonable certainty, uniformity, and fairness.
Soon after the Tax Court decided Turner the Commissioner
moved to vacate and remand the case for entry of a new decision. 7
This reversal of position followed a series of conferences "between
counsel for the appellee in the Tax Division of the Department of
Justice and. . . officials of the Internal Revenue Service and of the
Office of the Chief Counsel of the Internal Revenue Service. T7  The
government may have assumed that by filing a motion to vacate
and remand the case for entry of no deficiency, the original Tax
Court opinion would have no precedential value.79 Moreover, the
expenses incurred between residence and a temporary work site. The Eighth Circuit con-
cluded that the district court's finding of temporary employment was not clearly erroneous.
In Rev. Rul. 80-333, 1980-2 C.B. 60, the IRS announced that it will not follow Frederick
because "[t]he Eighth Circuit's approach conflicts in principle with a long line of judicial
authority holding such expenses are not deductible." The IRS cited Commissioner v. Flow-
ers, 326 U.S. 465 (1946), and Peurifoy v. Commissioner, 254 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1957), aff'd
per curiam, 358 U.S. 59 (1958). The IRS added that Frederick was contrary to Rev. Rul. 60-
189, 1960-1 C.B. 60. Rev. Rul. 80-333, 1980-2 C.B. 60. Revenue Ruling 60-189 contains an
extensive discussion of the deductibility of traveling expenses, including amounts that tax-
payers expend for meals and lodging when they work at construction sites that are distant
from their residences and from the places where they usually work or make employment
contacts.
77. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
78. Appellee's Motion to Vacate Decision of Tax Court, at 2, Turner v. Commissioner,
No. 71-1926 (2d Cir. Feb. 28, 1972). On May 18, 1972, the Tax Court entered the order
vacating the June 14, 1971, decision of the court, and on June 16, 1972, the Tax Court
entered the order of no deficiency. Turner v. Commissioner, No. 4374-68 (T.C. June 16,
1972).
79. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 578 n.12 (1975); see also County of Los
Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 634 n.6 (1979) (a decision vacating a judgment deprives the
lower court's opinion of precedential effect). But see id. at 646 n.10 (according to the dis-
sent, although a decision vacating a judgment necessarily prevents the opinion from being
the law of the case, expressions of the court below on the merits continue to have preceden-
tial weight). In the Turner proceedings the Commissioner moved to vacate "the decision of
the Tax Court" and to remand for entry of "a new decision" to the effect that no deficiency
existed. Appellee's Motion to Vacate Decision of Tax Court at 1, Turner v. Commissioner,
No. 71-1926 (2d Cir. Feb. 28, 1972). The Commissioner did not move to vacate the report or
opinion of the Tax Court. The Second Circuit vacated "the decision of the United States
Tax Court dated June 14, 1971," and remanded "for entry of a new decision." Order Grant-
ing Appellee's Motion to Vacate and Remand, Turner v. Commissioner, No. 71-1926 (2d Cir.
Mar. 21, 1972). The court had filed the report for Turner, which appears at 56 T.C. 27, on
April 8, 1971. The statement "Decision will be entered under Rule 50" appears at the end
of the report. 56 T.C. at 33. Under Rule 50, the predecessor of current Rule 155, the parties
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absence of Tax Court reports relying on Turner from the time that
the Second Circuit granted the motion until 1976, when the Tax
Court decided Norwood v. Commissioner,"° suggests that the Com-
missioner had conceded the deductibility of transportation ex-
penses as he finally did in Turner.
Five years after the Turner opinion the IRS framed the trans-
portation expense issue in Norwood"1 "in classical terms, namely,
whether petitioner's employment . . . was 'temporary' or 'indefi-
nite.' "82 The Tax Court stated that under this approach Turner
had no bearing.83 Lawrence W. Norwood had been a member of a
steamfitter's local union in Washington, D.C., since 1964. He re-
sided near the District of Columbia in Adelphi, Maryland. Because
of a shortage of work in the Washington, D.C., area, the union sent
Norwood to Lusby, Maryland, in October 1971; Initially, Norwood
expected his assignment at Lusby to last six months. Actually he
worked in Lusby, which is about fifty miles southeast of Washing-
ton, D.C., until December 1974. Whenever Norwood went to Lusby
he drove from his residence in Adelphi to the work site and re-
turned the same day.84 Revenue Ruling 190 required the IRS to
allow Norwood to deduct his transportation expenses if he was em-
ployed temporarily at Lusby.85 The court held that Norwood could
deduct his transportation expenses from October 1971 until March
1972, when his initial assignment ended." According to the court,
employment is temporary if the taxpayer expects it to last for only
in Turner submitted computations showing the amount of deficiency. The court then en-
tered its decision. On remand the Tax Court entered the decision June 16, 1972, which
stated that "there [was] no deficiency." Turner v. Commissioner, No. 4374-68 (T.C. June 16,
1972).
80. 66 T.C. 467 (1976).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 469; see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
83. 66 T.C. at 469.
84. Id. at 468.
85. 1953-2 C.B. 303. Revenue Ruling 190 provides in part that if a person works for a
temporary period "at a distance from the metropolitan area in which he is regularly em-
ployed," expenses for daily transportation are deductible. Id. at 305. The rationale for this
statement is that the taxpayer is not going between his residence and his principal or regu-
lar place of business. Since the taxpayer lives and customarily works in the metropolitan
area and does not have regular employment at a specific location or with one employer, his
principal or regular place of employment is the metropolitan area itself. Transportation ex-
penses between the metropolitan area and the taxpayer's work site are "necessarily incurred
for business reasons, rather than for personal reasons as in the case of a commuter who fixes
his residence as a matter of personal convenience and preference at a distance from his
regular place of business." Id.
86. Norwood v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. at 471.
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a short time.8 7 Because Norwood's first assignment was to continue
for only six months, the assignment was temporary.
A few months after the court filed its report for Norwood, the
IRS changed its position:88 it published Revenue Ruling 76-453,
which revoked Revenue Ruling 190,89 and cited Turner.90 Reading
Turner unnecessarily broadly, the Service determined that trans-
portation expenses between a person's residence and temporary
place of business are not deductible.
Revenue Ruling 76-453 sets forth several examples, some of
which merely restate prior law. Thus, in Example (2) of the reve-
nue ruling the IRS allowed no deduction for a taxpayer without a
principal or regular place of business who drove seventy miles each
way between residence and work. Consistent with Turner, the IRS
regarded this taxpayer as a commuter. Example (3), which also re-
flected the application of prior law, described a self-employed indi-
vidual who maintained a principal place of business in a downtown
office building. To attend a business meeting in a distant city, the
taxpayer drove directly from his residence to an airport and flew to
the meeting. The same day he returned directly to his residence.
The IRS stated that the taxpayer could deduct transportation
costs for the entire trip because Revenue Ruling 55-109 allows de-
duction of transportation costs between work locations. 1 The IRS
added that, "in effect," the taxpayer traveled between two work
locations.9 2 The IRS was willing to allow the expenses of the entire
trip because, it reasoned, the difference between the cost of going
from the residence to the business meeting, on the one hand, and
the cost of going from the office to the business meeting, on the
other hand, is generally de minimis when compared with the total
cost.9"
In Example (5) of Revenue Ruling 76-453 the IRS illustrated
its repudiation of Revenue Ruling 190 and its acceptance of Tur-
87. Id. at 469 (quoting Tucker v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 783, 786 (1971)).
88. Rev. Rul. 76-453, 1976-2 C.B. 86.
89. Id. at 88.
90. Id. at 86.
91. 1955-1 C.B. 261. Thus, "[w]here an employee having only one employer is required
to work part of the same day at each of two different locations within the same city, it is
clear that he must make a business trip which is directly attributable to the actual perform-
ance of his duties, and that his necessary transportation expenses in going from his first to
his second place of employment would generally be deductible." Id. at 263 (emphasis in
original).




ner. This example declared that the costs of daily trips to work at
different locations for temporary periods are not deductible even if
the taxpayer traveled outside the metropolitan area in which he
lived and ordinarily worked. The rationale for this rule is that no
deduction should be allowable for transportation expenses between
the residence and place of work."4
Although Examples (3) and (5) of Revenue Ruling 76-453 are
factually dissimilar, the outcomes should be the same. The differ-
ent results that the IRS reached higlight the problems of apply-
ing a wooden reading of Turner and the inconsistency of the IRS's
interpretation of that case. Under Revenue Ruling 76-453 a tax-
payer with a principal place of business in a building can deduct
the entire expense for transportation to another work place outside
the area of regular employment. On the other hand, a taxpayer
who usually works at different sites within the same area may de-
duct none of the transportation expenses to a temporary work
place outside that area.
Revenue Ruling 76-453 was controversial from the outset. 5
The focus of the criticism was that the revenue ruling encouraged
workers like accountants and lawyers to go first to the office, even
if that trip was unnecessary, because they then could deduct the
second trip from the office to the job site even if they did not go
outside their regular work area. Construction workers must have
felt especially aggrieved by the consequences of this revenue rul-
ing. Lacking regular places of work to which they could report first,
these workers could take no deduction for travel outside their nor-
mal employment areas.
The IRS postponed the effective date of Revenue Ruling 76-
453 from January 1, 1977, to April 1, 1977, to allow the incoming
Carter Administration an opportunity to review the new position.98
When the IRS announced a second delay of the effective date to
July 1, 1977, it said that it was extending the time to permit em-
ployers to adjust their payroll systems because they would have to
withhold taxes if employers reimbursed employees.97 A few days
later the IRS changed the effective date of Revenue Ruling 76-453
to October 1, 1977, again to give employers time to adjust their
94. Id. at 87.
95. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1977, at 67, col. 1; Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1977, at 17,
col. 1; Wall St. J., June 16, 1977, at 40, col. 2; Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 1976, at 2, col. 1.
96. Wall St. J., Dec. 29, 1976, at 2, col. 1; see supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
97. Wall St. J., June 16, 1977, at 40, col. 2.
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payroll systems.98 Finally, the IRS suspended the revenue ruling
indefinitely.9 The IRS announced that it would publish proposed
regulations "shortly" 100 to allow public comment. 011 Less than two
months after the IRS suspended Revenue Ruling 76-453, it advised
its personnel that "[n]o adjustment or claim disallowance will be
proposed for substantiated transportation expenses to temporary
job sites regardless of the distances traveled, within or without"
the metropolitan area where the taxpayer resides and ordinarily
works.10 1 The rationale for this new position was that "no legal dif-
ferentiation" exists between transportation expenses to temporary
work sites outside the metropolitan area and to temporary work
sites within the area. 03 This view contrasted sharply with prior ju-
dicial and administrative interpretations.
Although the IRS seems willing to concede the issue of de-
ductibility of transportation expenses to temporary job sites within
and without the taxpayer's metropolitan area, it has not informed
the public of this development. Rather, the IRS has stated repeat-
edly that nondeductible "commuting" expenses include transpor-
tation expenses between a taxpayer's residence and different work
locations on different days within the same city or general area,
while daily, round trip transportation expenses between the resi-
dence and temporary assignments beyond the general area of resi-
dence and regular work are deductible. 04 Consequently, the pub-
lished statements of the IRS for taxpayers reiterate the position
that it first took in Revenue Ruling 190,105 which is still in effect
because of the suspension of Revenue Ruling 76-453.10 The public
position that the IRS has taken may be attributable to the con-
gressional mandate that the IRS determine the deductibility of
98. Wall St. J., June 29, 1977, at 13, col. 2.
99. IRS News Rel. IR-1884 (Sept. 23, 1977), [1977] 6 FED. TAXES (P-H) 55,898; see
supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
100. N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1977, at 67, col. 1.
101. Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1977, at 17, col. 1.
102. II INTERNAL REV. MAN. (CCH) ch. 4500, pt. IV, 45(11)(17)(6), at 8217-4 (Nov. 3,
1977) (emphasis in original). In general, the Manual does not bind revenue agents, but it
does serve to provide guidance. Letter Rul. 8246013 (June 30, 1982); see II INTERNAL REv.
MAN. (CCH) ch. 4000, pt. IV, 4012, at 7006 (Oct. 29, 1981).
103. II INTERNAL REV. MAN. (CCH) ch. 4500, pt. IV, 45(11)(17)(4), at 8217-4 (Nov. 3,
1977).
104. U.S. TREAs. DEm'T, INT. RV. SERV., YOUR FEDERAL INcOME TAX FOR INDMDUALS
(Pub. 17) at 64 (rev. Oct. 1977). The IRS has published identical statements subsequently.
Id. at 60 (rev. Nov. 1978); id. at 64 (rev. Nov. 1979); id. at 69 (rev. Nov. 1980); id. at 64 (rev.
Nov. 1981); id. at 68-69 (rev. Nov. 1982).
105. 1953-2 C.B. 303. See supra note 85.
106. 1976-2 C.B. 86. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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transportation costs paid or incurred between January 1, 1977, and
June 1, 1981, without regard to Revenue Ruling 76-453 or any sim-
ilar decision. 10 7 The legislative history of Congress' action indicates
that transportation expenses to temporary work sites other than
the principal place of work "often" are deductible." 8
VI. A CRITIQUE OF OTHER PROPOSALS
Congress and legal commentators along with the IRS have
struggled to devise a workable solution to the problem of the de-
ductibility of transportation expenses. Although Congress has been
aware of the problem of the deductibility of transportation ex-
penses to and from temporary work sites for at least two decades,
but has been unwilling to legislate a bright-line test,109 even when
the President has proposed remedial legislation.110 Under the pres-
idential proposal a taxpayer could not deduct transportation ex-
penses for traveling between his residence and any place within a
"duty area,"1 defined by a circle having a twenty-mile radius with
the taxpayer's principal post of duty at its center. If a taxpayer
had no principal place of business, his residence would serve as the
center of the duty area.112 Travel expenses to a temporary work
107. Act of Dec. 29, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-167, § 2, 93 Stat. 1275 (1979); Act of Oct. 7,
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-427, § 2, 92 Stat. 996 (1978); see supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
108. S. RaE. No. 433, supra note 25, at 5, reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 2598; H.R. REP. No. 1232, supra note 25, at 6, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 2511.
109. One commentator has set forth four possible bright-line statutory rules. Hoff,
Tax Treatment of Home-To-Work Expenses, 6 REv. TAX'N INWivmuALs 40 (1982). These
rules are as follows: (1) "Treat daily home-to-work trip expenses as personal and allow an
itemized deduction for the outlay computed as an amount in excess of a stated percentage
of adjusted gross income." Id. at 60. (2) "Treat daily home-to-work trip expenses in excess
of a stated number of miles as an adjustment to gross income. Place a dollar limitation on
the maximum amount allowable." Id. at 61. (3) "Treat all unreimbursed home-to-work trip
expenses as nondeductible personal expenses." Id. (4) "Treat daily home-to-work trip ex-
penses like expenses incurred for child and dependent care and allow all taxpayers a credit
against tax for a percentage of such expenses up to a stated maximum dollar amount." Id.
at 60-61.
One economist has justified the rule disallowing deduction of commuting expenses on
the grounds that permitting deduction would accentuate existing inequities between subur-
ban home owners and urban apartment renters, encourage further decentralization, and
stimulate extravagant means of commuting. R. GOODE, supra note 75, at 78.
110. President's 1963 Tax Message, Hearings on Tax Recommendations of President
Contained in Message Transmitted to Congress Jan. 24, 1963, before House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 98 (1963) [hereinafter cited as President's
1963 Tax Message].
111. Id. at 99.
112. Id. at 98.
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site beyond the duty area would be deductible under the proposed
legislation. 113 Furthermore, a taxpayer would be temporarily away
from the duty area unless he reasonably could have foreseen that
he would remain at a new place of work for at least a year or he
actually remained there for a year.
114
In 1978 one commentator proposed the addition of a new sub-
section to section 162115 that would allow a deduction for transpor-
tation expenses between a taxpayer's residence and temporary
place of business for any amount in excess of the cost that the tax-
payer normally incurred traveling between his residence and his
permanent place of business. For a taxpayer whose employment
consists of a series of temporary jobs, a twenty-five mile radius
would distinguish nondeductible commuting expenses from de-
ductible business expenses.116
The proposal contains a defect in its treatment of a taxpayer
who has a permanent place of business. The proposal fails to pre-
vent the potential abuse that can result from a taxpayer's applica-
tion of Revenue Ruling 55-109.17 The revenue ruling acknowledges
that transportation expenses between business locations are de-
ductible.' To avoid the commuting characterization and thus
maximize the deduction for transportation expenses, a taxpayer
113. JOINT COMM. STAFF ON INT. REv. TAx., 88TH CONG., 1ST SESS., SUMMARY OF PRESI-
DENT'S 1963 TAx MESSAGE AS PRESENTED TO HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS 31 (Comm.
Print 1963).
114. President's 1963 Tax Message, supra note 110, at 98.
115. Note, Extraordinary Commuting Expenses: Deductibility of Transportation Ex-
penses Between Residence and Temporary Place of Business, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 499, 521-
25 (1978).
116. Id. at 521. For the suggestion that daily transportation expenses beyond a 10-mile
radius from residence to temporary job should be deductible, see Klein, Income Taxation
and Commuting Expenses: Tax Policy and the Need for Nonsimplistic Analysis of "Sim-
ple" Problems, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 871, 895 (1969). Nine miles is the average commuting
distance. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE JOURNEY TO WORK IN THE
UNITED STATES: 1975, at 6 (1979). Under I.R.C. § 162(h)(4), [I Code] FED. TAXES 25,196.50
(P-H) (1982) a state legislator's residence within the legislative district must be more than
50 miles from the capitol building before the legislator can make a subsection (h) election.
Subsection (h) provides in part that the legislator's residence within the district counstitutes
his home for purposes of § 162(a).
117. 1955-1 C.B. 261. See Note, supra note 115, at 521 & n.125, 522 n.126.
118. Id. at 263; see supra note 91. For an opinion that supports and illustrates the
principle, see Green v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 456, 460 (1972). An excellent discussion of the
methods for computing the deduction when a taxpayer works at two locations the same day
appears in Popkin, Deduction of Traveling Expenses by the Two-Worker Family-An In-
quiry into the Role of the Courts in Interpreting the Federal Tax Law, 55 Tax. L. Rav. 645,
647-50 (1977). Letter Rul. 8023052 (Mar. 12, 1980) applies Revenue Ruling 55-109 to a tax-
payer with three jobs.
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merely has to make a business stop close to his residence on the
way to the permanent place of business and again on the way back
to his residence at the end of the day. The proposal's commuting
floor, which only applies to the trip from residence to temporary
work site and back, is not broad enough to prevent this abuse.119
For the temporary employee, however, no floor is necessary.
Without a permanent work location the temporary employee can-
not avoid a fixed commuting distance. The only reasonable and ec-
onomical route for a temporary employee with several stops in one
day is to start with the closest location, work out to the farthest
stop, and reverse the process on the return to his residence. 120 The
remaining problem for the temporary employee is to define prop-
erly the work area that establishes his fixed commuting distance.
An arbitrarily drawn circle with a twenty-five mile radius is inap-
propriate because it lacks an economic foundation.
Another commentator has suggested a similar approach, al-
though the plan rests on the assumption that the IRS and the
courts will reinterpret section 162(a). 21 Under this plan a taxpayer
with a principal work site would be able to deduct the cost of
transportation in excess of the cost of one round trip a day to that
site. 1 22 Even a taxpayer without a permanent work site would be
able to deduct the "comparative excess cost," which would be the
difference between the transportation expense from the taxpayer's
residence to the temporary site and the transportation expense
from the taxpayer's residence to the edge of the general work
119. A taxpayer who has a principal place of work outside the residence may be able
to deduct the expenses in excess of the cost of one round trip a day to that place. See Shea
v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1178 (1979); cf. Laurano v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 723,
726 (1978) (daily transportation expenses from residence to first business related stop and
from last business related stop to residence are nondeductible commuting expenses to ex-
tent distance traveled does not exceed distance between residence and principal place of
work). The taxpayer, however, should not deduct expenses for personal trips, such as those
to eat or rest.
120. If the taxpayer has an office in his residence that is his principal place of busi-
ness, trips to other work sites are deductible. Curphey v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 766, 778
(1980) (appeal pending); see also Wisconsin Psychiatric Servs., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 76
T.C. 839, 849 (1981) (taxpayer may deduct transportation expenses between his residence
and other places of business if the office in the residence is so central to the enterprise that
the trips constitute normal business transportation).
121. Dilman, Automobile Transportation Expenses: A Rough Tax Road, 55 TAXEs
571, 578 (1977).
122. Id. The excess cost would be deductible by "those who go to work from home
more than once per day, or have two jobs, or have a job and go to school for work-related
purposes." Id. "[T]hose who have a regular work location and go, instead, to a temporary
work location" also would be able to deduct the excess cost. Id.
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area.123 This plan, however, makes no attempt to define the general
work area. Furthermore, personal trips to the taxpayer's residence
and back to work during the day apparently would be deductible.
These trips might be for purposes of eating, resting, or returning to
work to respond to an emergency. Because these trips are purely
personal, the IRS and the courts should regard them as
commuting. 124
VII. A SUGGESTED APPROACH FOR THE COURTS
Despite the problems that Turner v. Commissioner presents,
the Tax Court probably will not overrule the holding. Only one
judge on the court dissented,125 and the court repeatedly has cited
the opinion, albeit in dicta.12 Furthermore, a majority of the full
membership of the Tax Court is necessary to overrule existing
precedent.
12 7
The conclusion in Turner that the transportation expenses of
the taxpayer were not deductible is correct. Turner was attempting
123. Cf. id. at 579.
124. Potenga v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 687 (1976); see Beltran v. Commis-
sioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 892 (1982) (any leg of journey that begins or ends at residence
constitutes commuting). No deduction is allowable for extra duty or emergency trips to the
regular place of business. O'Hare v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 874, 875 (1970); Sheldon v. Com-
missioner, 50 T.C. 24, 27 (1968); Marot v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 238 (1961); see also Arnold
v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1847-94 (1978) (no deduction allowed urologist in travel-
ing from residence to hospital or any other place to practice medicine); Letter Rul. 8014016
(Dec. 21, 1979) (emergency trips of pediatricians between residences and hospital to visit
patients are nondeductible commuting expenses). But see Sapp v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.
852, 854-55 (1961) (physician allowed partial deduction for emergency house calls when at
social engagements). In Shea v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1178 (1979), the court said
it has noted that expenses which a physician incurred in emergency or house calls to pa-
tients may be deductible. In Bovington v. United States, 41 A.F.T.R.2d 78-762 (D. Mont.
1977), the court permitted taxpayer to deduct daily transportation expenses incurred in
practicing medicine except the estimated cost of one round trip between residence and of-
fice. In Boerner v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 240 (1971), the court allowed taxpayer a
deduction for transportation expenses even though taxpayer stopped at his residence for
lunch after attending work related classes at a nearby university and before going to his
principal place of business. Rev. Rul. 55-109, 1955-1 C.B. 261, states that a taxpayer with
two employers may deduct the cost of going to the second job despite a stop at the residence
for dinner. Nevertheless, the deduction is permissible only to the extent that the cost does
not exceed the expense that the taxpayer would have incurred if he had gone directly from
the first job to the second one. Id. at 264. Conceptually, at least, trips from one job to the
residence and from the residence to another job constitute commuting.
125. 56 T.C. 27, 33 (1971) (Quealy, J., dissenting).
126. See, e.g., Portillo v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 1085 (1982); Conte v. Com-
missioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1296 (1981); Harris v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 1126
(1980); McCallister v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 505 (1978); Gurney v. Commissioner, 30
T.C.M. (CCH) 1429 (1971).
127. H. DUBROFF, supra note 44, at 357.
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to deduct commuting expenses; he merely traveled between his
residence and places of work.128 The difficulty that the opinion
poses arises from its sweeping statements predicated on opaque
analysis.129 Nevertheless, on the strength of these statements the
Tax Court has said that transportation expenses for daily trips to
temporary work sites outside the regular area of employment are
not deductible.130
Instead of overruling Turner, the Tax Court has sought to ac-
commodate the Commissioner and taxpayers by applying the tem-
porary/indefinite test to determine the deductibility of transporta-
tion expenses for daily trips to distant work sites., The court in
effect has ignored the Turner precedent. Moreover, when the Tax
Court articulated the issue in temporary versus indefinite terms,
Congress had not yet directed that the treatment of transportation
costs between a taxpayer's residence and work place be determined
without regard to Revenue Ruling 76-453 or any similar decision." '
The Tax Court probably will decide the daily transportation costs
issue in classical terms for costs paid or incurred after the May 31,
1981, expiration date of the Congressional mandate. 133 Indeed, the
Norwood procedure seems to be the only way that the Tax Court
can extricate itself from Turner short of overruling the case. Nor-
wood applied the two-prong test of Revenue Ruling 190.134 To sat-
isfy the first prong, the taxpayer's work at a distant site must be
temporary.1ss According to the Tax Court, work is temporary if the
taxpayer can expect it to last for only a short time.13 ' To meet the
128. See supra text accompanying notes 30-36.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 38-51.
130. Portillo v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 1085 (1982); Conte v. Commissioner,
42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1296 (1981); McCallister v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 505 (1978); see supra
text accompanying notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
131. McCallister v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 505, 508 (1978); Norwood v. Commissioner,
66 T.C. 467, 469 (1976). Recent cases in which the court adopted this approach include
Hazelton v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1287 (1982); Fairey v. Commissioner, 43
T.C.M. (CCH) 1169 (1982); Faircloth v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1115 (1982). But
see Paolini v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 513 (1982), af/'d, No. 82-3290 (3d. Cir. Jan.
17, 1983), discussed infra note 157.
132. Act of Oct. 7, 1978, Pus. L. No. 95-427, § 2, 92 Stat. 996; see supra text accompa-
nying notes 22-24. The court filed the report for Norwood June 15, 1976. 66 T.C. at 467. The
IRS had determined the deficiencies in Norwood for 1972 and 1973. Id. In McCallister the
court filed the report June 19, 1978. 70 T.C. at 505. The IRS had determined the deficien-
cies for 1973. Id. at 506.
133. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
134. 1953-2 C.B. 303; see Harris v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 1126 (1980).
135. 1953-2 C.B. at 305.
136. Norwood v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 467, 469 (quoting Tucker v. Commissioner, 55
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second prong the work must have occurred outside the "general
area" of the taxpayer's principal place of employment.1
3 7
The Tax Court has discussed the boundaries of the general
area only once. In Harris v. Commissioner' the court said that
county lines surrounding a residence are not the outer limits of the
general area of a taxpayer's principal place of employment. Conse-
quently, a surveyor who worked at seven job sites in Los Angeles
County, California, where he lived, could not deduct transportation
expenses to three job sites in adjoining Orange County. The three
Orange County locations were fifty to eighty-one miles from his
residence. Writing for the Tax Court, Judge Goffe observed:
The fortuitous location of a county line does not limit the general area of
a taxpayer's principal or regular place of employment, especially in cases,
such as the present one, where petitioner's work takes him all over a far-flung
metropolitan area. As a surveyor living in the Los Angeles metropolitan area,
petitioner could expect to be employed anywhere within that general area.
The crossing of a county line which bisects an otherwise integrated metropol-
itan area does not necessarily prove that petitioner has left the general area
of his principal or regular place of employment. We hold that the general
area of petitioner's principal or regular place of employment in 1973 was the
Los Angeles metropolitan area.139
The Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court's determination
that the Orange County work sites were within the "general area"
of taxpayer's principal place of employment. 140 Noting the Tax
Court's failure to define the boundaries of the metropolitan area,
the court found that the Orange County jobs were outside tax-
payer's normal work area not only because they were in a different
county from the one in which he lived and usually worked, but also
T.C. 783, 786 (1971)). One writer has observed: "The determination whether a job is tempo-
rary or of indefinite duration depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case,
and the determination is generally not clear-cut." Comment, Travel, Transportation, and
Commuting Expenses, supra note 51, at 533.
137. Rev. Rul. 190, 1953-2 C.B. at 305.
138. 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 1126 (1980).
139. Id. at 1132. In Schmidt v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1529 (1977), the Com-
missioner conceded that Mentone, California, a city in San Bernardino County, which is
adjacent to Orange and Los Angeles Counties, was outside the Los Angeles metropolitan
area. The metropolitan area constituted the principal place of employment for taxpayer, a
millwright, who worked at approximately nine sites during the taxable year 1973. He worked
for 15 days at the Mentone site, which was over 77 miles from his residence in Anaheim
(Orange County). Writing for the court, Judge Wilbur stated that the employer's shop and
taxpayer's residence were both located in the Los Angeles metropolitan area and that all the
other job sites were located within the City of Los Angeles except one, which was on the
city's outskirts in close proximity to Schmidt's residence. Judge Wilbur concluded that Rev.
Rul. 190, 1953-2 C.B. 303, permitted taxpayer to deduct the expenses of traveling to and
from Mentone since it was outside the Los Angeles metropolitan area. Id. at 1530.
140. Harris v. Commissioner, No. 80-7466 (9th Cir. May 13, 1982).
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because they were a considerable distance from taxpayer's resi-
dence and outside the jurisdiction of his local union.141
The Tax Court in Harris stated that courts should not use a
single county to define the metropolitan area.1 42 A county is a po-
litical unit,143 with county seats and boundaries traditionally lo-
cated to allow a person to travel by horse and carriage from his
residence to the courthouse and back again between sunrise and
sunset.1 44 Today, because of improved transportation, daily travel
over significant distances is common. As a result, the use of the
county to define a taxpayer's metropolitan area is anachronistic
and out of step with economic reality.1 45 The Tax Court was in-
deed correct in refusing to use county lines to delimit the metro-
politan area.
The federal government has identified metropolitan areas us-
ing concentrations of urban development with close internal com-
muting ties and weak relationships with other areas.1 46 The gov-
ernment has designated more than 320 areas of the country
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs).1'7 The Los An-
geles SMSA encompasses only Los Angeles County. Therefore, if
the Tax Court in Harris had used the SMSA system to identify the
metropolitan area, the court would have concluded that taxpayer's
transportation expenses to and from Orange County were
141. Whether in future cases the Ninth Circuit would examine all three elements, or
perhaps only one or two in defining a taxpayer's work area, is impossible to determine from
the opinion. The court might consider only the boundaries of a local union. This approach,
however, raises two problems. First, the boundaries would not apply to nonunion activities.
Second, the boundaries of a local union may not encompass a functionally interrelated eco-
nomic area and, hence, may be unsuitable as even a limited solution to the problem of
defining a metropolitan area. See infra text accompanying notes 146-55.
142. Harris v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1132.
143. A. HAWLEY, HUMAN ECOLOGY 258 (1950).
144. A. BROMAGE, AMERICAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT 196 (1933).
145. Id. at 267. See also W. ANDERSON, THE UNITS OF GoVERNMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 39 (1942) (explanation and development of local governmental units).
146. Federal Comm. on Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, Documents Relating
to the Metropolitan Statistical Area Classification for the 1980's, 80-11 STATISTICAL REP.
335, 349 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Documents].
147. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DBP'T OF COMMERCE, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION,
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORTS, STANDARD METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREAS AND STANDARD CON-
SOLIDATED STATISTICAL AREAS: 1980, at 1 (1981). The terminology recently has changed to
Consolidated Metropolitan Statistical Areas (CMSAs), Primary Metropolitan Statistical Ar-
eas (PMSAs), and Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs). CMSAs are groups of contiguous
Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs). SMSAs within CMSAs are PMSAs, and
SMSAs elsewhere are MSAs. See Wall St. J., Oct. 12, 1982, at 35, col. 1. For a discussion of




The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) of the United States
Department of Commerce has devised a somewhat different system
for identifying metropolitan areas. The BEA has divided the na-
tion into more than 180 areas based primarily on journey-to-work
data from the Census of Population, newspaper circulation data,
and county commuting data developed from Social Security Ad-
ministration and IRS records.'49 The BEA Economic Area for Los
Angeles, California, encompasses not only Los Angeles County but
also eight other counties, including Orange County. If the Tax
Court in Harris had used the BEA Economic Area for Los Angeles
to define the metropolitan area, the court would have concluded
that taxpayer failed to satisfy the second prong of Revenue Ruling
190.150
Unlike the SMSA system, the BEA system is suitable for iden-
tifying metropolitan areas that constitute principal places of busi-
ness within the meaning of Revenue Ruling 190. SMSAs cover less
than one-fifth of the country and fail to account for one-fourth of
the population.' 51 Presumably, taxpayers who do not live within
SMSAs could not satisfy the second prong of the test under Reve-
nue Ruling 190. Moreover, two experts have questioned whether
SMSAs accurately define functionally interrelated areas. 1 5  BEA
Economic Areas, on the other hand, have several advantages. First,
since they completely cover the country, no gaps exist. Second, the
BEA Economic Areas are not likely to change significantly. 153
148. Although the following reports of the Tax Court do not discuss the definition of
metropolitan area, they contain descriptions of metropolitan areas that approximate SM-
SAs: Dady v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 781, 785 (1981); Smith v. Commissioner, 36
T.C.M. (CCH) 1081, 1081 (1977); Boerner v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 240, 241
(1971); Havens Structural Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 1121, 1122 (1958).
149. BUREAU OF ECONoMic ANALYsis, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BEA ECONOMIC AREAS
1 (rev. 1977).
150. 1953-2 C.B. 303. Although the following reports of the Tax Court do not discuss
the definition of metropolitan area, they do contain descriptions of metropolitan areas that
approximate BEA Economic Areas: Lieb v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1231, 1233
(1974); Hoffman, v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 176, 176 (1967); Armstrong v. War Contracts
Price Adjustment Bd., 15 T.C. 625, 626 (1950).
151. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 147, at 1.
152. See B. BERRY & J. KASARDA, CONTEMPORARY URBAN ECOLOGY 164 (1977) (quoted
infra note 155).
153. Id. at 285, 287. The Bureau of Economic Analysis will review 1980 Census com-
muting data and a work-history sample based on Social Security data and revise the BEA
Economic Area boundaries if necessary. Any changes will become effective after 1984 or
1985 to maintain continuity. Telephone interview with Edward A. Trott, Jr., Assistant to
the Chief, Regional Economic Analysis Div., Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep't of
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Hence, the BEA system is more stable and over time should foster
more consistent treatment of taxpayers within the same area.
Third, the BEA has drawn the boundaries of its Economic Areas to
encompass both the places-of-residence and the places-of-work of
the labor force, including construction workers.1 54 The boundaries
under the SMSA system are restrictive and artificial by compari-
son, 155 especially for the purposes of Revenue Ruling 190.
As a cautious measure, taxpayers should seek refunds and liti-
gate before the district courts rather than the Tax Court to deduct
daily transportation expenses. In view of the Tax Court's state-
ments that Turner precludes a deduction for daily transportation
expenses to and from distant temporary work sites, 56 the court
may disregard Norwood and apply Turner.5 7 The Fifth,' Sev-
enth,5 9 Eighth, 60 and Ninth'6 ' Circuits have applied the tempo-
Commerce (Oct. 13, 1982).
154. Regional Economic Analysis Div., Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, The BEA Economic Areas: Structural Changes and Growth, 1950-73, 55 SuRV.
CURRENT Bus. 14, 15 (1975).
155. Two experts have criticized the SMSA system as follows:
1. The areas economically and socially integrated with the central cities are far more
extensive than the formal boundaries of SMSAs.
2. In the least densely populated parts of the nation's settled areas, regionally impor-
tant commuting fields gravitate around urban centers of less than fifty thousand peo-
ple. [Generally, a city of at least 50,000 has been required for a metropolitan area des-
ignation under the SMSA system. This requirement was relaxed somewhat to permit
areas to be defined around smaller cities when specified conditions were met. See Doc-
uments, supra note 146, at 339.]
3. At the other extreme, particularly in the manufacturing belt, labor markets overlap
in elaborate ways. The urban regions of the "megalopolises" are highly complex, mul-
ticentered entities.
B. BERRY & J. KASARDA, supra note 152, at 164 (1977).
The boundaries under the SMSA system appear to have their basis in part on subjec-
tive notions that metropolitan areas ought to be urban, rather than rural, in character, with
large concentrations of population. See Documents, supra note 146 at 350.
156. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
157. In Paolini v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 513 (1982), afl'd, No. 82-3290 (3d
Cir. Jan. 17, 1983), the Tax Court took precisely that action. The court held that for 1975,
1976, and 1977 automobile expenses for daily transportation between a construction super-
visor's apartment, where he lived during the week away from his family, and work sites were
not deductible. The court observed that although it previously had consented to decide sim-
ilar cases on the basis of Revenue Ruling 190 "if both parties so framed the issues," in
Paolini the court agreed with the Commissioner's contention "that petitioner's daily trips to
and from clearly temporary job sites [were] nondeductible commuting expenses." 43 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 517. The court failed to realize that Revenue Ruling 190 was inapplicable because
Paolini was not going to work outside the area of his principal place of business. He simply
was commuting to and from his principal and only places of work. Hence, the court's over-
broad application of Turner was not necessary to decide the case.
158. Boone v. United States, 482 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973).
159. Kasun v. United States, 671 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1982).
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rary/indefinite test to decide whether these expenses are deducti-
ble. The position that these circuits have taken is sound,16 2 and
other circuits probably would adopt the same approach.
VIII. A SUGGESTED APPROACH FOR THE IRS
The IRS should not attempt to follow the sweeping statements
of the Tax Court in Turner. Rather, it should limit the holding to
the facts of the case. The efforts of the IRS to follow Turner in
Revenue Ruling 76-453 evoked public outcry' 63 and congressional
reaction. 6 4 Moreover, Turner has led the IRS to treat inconsis-
tently taxpayers who travel to distant temporary work sites.6 5 The
IRS should develop the position set forth in Revenue Ruling 190,
which articulated a reasonable interpretation of the deductibility
of daily transportation expenses to and from distant temporary
work sites. Revenue Ruling 190, however, neglected to define the
terms "metropolitan area" and "temporary," to explain how to as-
certain the metropolitan area of regular employment, or to identify
precisely which expenses are deductible.
The shortcomings of Revenue Ruling 190 are remediable.
First, according to the revenue ruling, daily transportation ex-
penses between the metropolitan area in which workers ordinarily
work and a distant project where they are employed for a tempo-
rary period are deductible.16 6 The IRS should define metropolitan
areas as BEA Economic Areas. 67 Second, the IRS may explain
"temporary" by resorting to the discussion in Revenue Ruling 60-
189. This definition has the advantage of its long-standing exis-
tence and use. The revenue ruling indicates that the IRS will treat
employment at a given location as temporary if both the antici-
pated and the actual duration of employment is less than one year.
Employment of anticipated or actual duration of a year or more at
a particular location creates a presumption that the taxpayer's
presence there is not temporary.6 8 Third, in most instances, the
taxpayer's area of regular employment is clear. When the area is in
160. Frederick v. United States, 603 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1979).
161. Neal v. Commissioner, 681 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1982).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 67-76.
163. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 88-95.
166. Rev. Rul. 190, 1953-2 C.B. at 305.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 149-54.
168. Rev. Rul. 60-189, 1960-1 C.B. at 63-64; see Rev. Rul. 74-291, 1974-1 C.B. 42.
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dispute, however, the IRS should apply the criteria that the courts
have used to determine the principal place of business of a tax-
payer who works at two distant sites and seeks to deduct meal and
lodging costs at one of them under section 162(a)(2). These criteria
include total time ordinarily spent at each place, the degree of bus-
iness activity at each place, and income that the taxpayer derived
from each place.16
Last, Revenue Ruling 190 fails to explain whether all or only
part of the daily transportation expenses are deductible when a
taxpayer travels to a work site located at a distance from the met-
ropolitan area where he regularly works. Two statements in the
ruling suggest that only the excess expenses-expenses for trans-
portation outside the metropolitan area-are deductible.170 This
view is the correct approach. During travel within the metropolitan
area, the taxpayer is a commuter, but outside the area the tax-
payer is not commuting 171 because the transportation actually is
from one place of business to another place of business. Of course,
all transportation expenses for trips outside the metropolitan area
could be deductible under a de minimis rule. 72 For a taxpayer who
goes outside the metropolitan area, however, application of the de
minimis rule should depend on the total distance the taxpayer
travels each day compared with the distance he travels outside the
metropolitan area. The IRS also would have to examine the size of
the area, the normal commuting distance, and the location of the
taxpayer's residence within the area. The IRS should not apply a
de minimis rule in the context of Revenue Ruling 190 because of
169. See, e.g., Folkman v. United States, 615 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1980); Markey v. Com-
missioner, 490 F.2d 1249 (6th Cir. 1974); Montgomery v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 175 (1975),
affd, 532 F.2d 1088 (6th Cir. 1976).
170. Revenue Ruling 190 refers to expenses for daily transportation between the met-
ropolitan area and the temporary work site as "necessarily incurred for business reasons."
1953-2 C.B. at 305. After indicating that the IRS will consider the principal or regular place
of employment as the metropolitan area in which a construction worker lives and customa-
rily carries on his trade, the revenue ruling says that the worker may deduct "his actual
expenses incurred for daily transportation between his principal or regular place of employ-
ment and such job . . . ." Id. In Schmidt v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1529 (1977),
however, the government conceded that the entire cost of transportation between the tax-
payer's residence and a temporary site outside the normal work area was deductible.
171. See, e.g., Steinhort v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1964); Adelberg v.
Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 68 (1971); Rev. Rul. 55-109, 1955-1 C.B. 261; Letter Rul.
8023052 (Mar. 12, 1980); see also Curphey v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 766, 778 (1980) (local
transportation expenses between principal place of business and another business location
motivated by purely business reasons are deductible), appeal dismissed, No. 80-7678 (9th
Cir. Feb. 22, 1982).
172. See supra text accompanying note 93.
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the potential complexities of administration.
IX. CONCLUSION
The IRS and the courts best can resolve the issue of the de-
ductibility of daily transportation expenses to and from distant
temporary work sites through application of the temporary/indefi-
nite test together with the rationale of Revenue Ruling 190. This
result well may have been what Congress desired when it prohib-
ited the application of Revenue Ruling 76-453 or any decision
reaching the same or a similar result.173 Refinement of Revenue
Ruling 190 is necessary and possible with minimal disruption to
existing interpretations of either Revenue Ruling 190 or the tem-
porary/indefinite test. The result not only should facilitate consis-
tent application of section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 but also should foster substantial fairness for all taxpayers
who must travel in the performance of their work.
173. See supra text accompanying note 22.
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